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M/S Costa Concordia acidentally
contacted a submerged rock
outside Isola del Giglio at 21.45 hrs
13 January 2012 and ripped open the
port side. Three hull compartments were partly
up-flooded. The
double bottom was intact. The damaged
condition was not serious. Ship was floating and
stable. The Master was happy. He could call for
a tug and be towed to a port for repairs.
However, electricty failed - black
out - and it was decided to
Abandon ship and bring the passengers
to Porto Giglio not far away to be sent
home. The ship lacked a complete crew to
launch all lifeboats and
life rafts and to muster
all passengers. The ship was not
seaworthy. There was panic
and fear. By pure luck most people aboard
managed to leave the ship mainly using
lifeboats. In the meantime there was
progressive flooding
through open, illegal
watertight doors. The doors were
opened by evacuating staff. The ship was
incorrectly designed and certified and not
seaworthy. Intact hull
compartments ensuring safety were flooded and at
00.32 hrs 14 January 2012
stability was lost and the
ship capsized, a fatal
incident. >300 persons still aboard were
trapped on the port side above water. 32 persons
still inside drowned. The hull was
down-flooded and the ship
sank on some rocks close to
shore. It was later decided that all was the
fault of the Master that had not refused to sail
with his not seaworthy
ship. It was decided to hide the fact
that the ship was not seaworthy
for mutiple reasons and that
insurances were not valid. It was
further decided to defraud
the underwriters and to bribe the judicial
authorities, etc, etc. It is easy. It happens in
Italy. Ever heard of the mafia? The IMO has therefore not seen any reason
to improve the rules for safety at sea
(SOLAS). x Appendix 1 - No improved safety of passenger ships (August 2015) The IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), 95th session, took place 3-12 June 2015, i.e. 3 and a half years after the Costa Concordia incidents January 2012. Item 6 was about passenger ship safety. Item 6.6 was about the SDC Sub-Committee (i) reviewing the conditions under which passenger ship watertight doors may be opened (sic) during navigation and (ii) preparing amendments to SOLAS regulation II-1/22 and MSC.1/Circ.1380; The MSC 95 then approved the draft amendments to SOLAS regulation II-1/22 to clarify when watertight doors may be opened (sic) (!) during a voyage (applicable to all ships). Hopefully these draft amendments will never be approved and included in SOLAS. Watertight doors are generally not permitted and, if fitted for any reasons, must be closed at sea. The MSC 95 however approved Guidance for watertight doors on passenger ships which may be opened during navigation, which includes appendices, containing: procedure for the determination of the impact of open watertight doors on passenger ship survivability (floatability assessment); The writer managed to get a copy of this Guidance 18 January 2016. It is crystal clear that watertight doors are not permitted but, if fitted by any exemptions, must always be closed at sea and cannot be opened without permission from the bridge with a note in the log book, etc, etc. Item 6.8 and 9 was about the capsizing of the passenger ship Costa Concordia 14 January 2012; the Committee (MSC 90, MSC 91, MSC 92 and MSC 93) has established a Working Group on Passenger Ship Safety, which has prepared the long-term action plan on passenger ship safety (MSC 93/WP.6/Rev.1, annex 3). Very little has been done! A long-term suggestion is (4) Development of onboard damage stability system (MSC, SDC, MSC 93/6/7, paragraphs 19 and 20 (CLIA), MSC 93/WP.6/Rev.1 ). This concerns the integration of remote soundings, flooding detection system and draught reading systems which would improve the usability of the stability system. Such a system was suggested by Heiwa Co via Sweden already after the M/S Estonia incident 28 September 1994 but was not accepted by the IMO then. Better late than never. Also to be long-termed reviewed is (Table 2. item 1) the conditions under which passenger ship watertight doors may be opened during navigation and prepare amendments to SOLAS regulation II-1/22 and MSC.1/Circ.1380. But it is for new ships only. The goal should be to obviate the need to pass through watertight doors during the daily work and activities on board. Some draft amendments for existing ships were approved (see above). It seems that the IMO does not understand that watertight doors are generally not permitted according SOLAS. The conclusion is that the IMO June 2015 has done nothing to improve safety of passenger ship since the Costa Concordia capsize and sinking 14 January 2012. Reason is that officially, according to IMO member Italy, the Costa Concordia was seaworthy and in perfect order at departure 13 January 2012 and that everything is just the fault of an incompetent Master (Francesco Schettino), which the IMO has adopted. Thus the IMO cannot learn anything from the incident.
Appendix 2 - REPORT OF THE MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE ON ITS NINETY-SECOND SESSION Pages 27-32 June 2013 regarding M/S Costa Concordia - review by Anders Björkman - and what happened May 2014 on the ninety-third session. Nothing has been done at the MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE at its ninety-third session May 2014. By March 2015 passenger ship safety has not improved since January 2012! Media say nothing. (May 2014)
Below is a copy of pages 27-32 of the June 2013 report of the IMO/MSC 92nd session about M/S Costa Concordia incidents January 13-14, 2012. It describes the not very professional work at IMO to improve safety at sea after the M/S Costa Concordia incidents. It is worthwhile to note:
Conclusions - the IMO/MSC work in respect of the M/S Costa Concordia incidents is very defective and does not contribute to improved safety at sea. One reason is the defective Italian incident report accusing the Master for everything and hiding the faults of the ship owner and the maritime authorities allowing a not seaworthy ship to operate. Read the June 2013 report below: BACKGROUND 6.1 The Committee recalled
that MSC 90 had agreed that the
fatal
capsizing of the
Costa Concordia had raised new challenges
for the Organization that needed to be addressed
expeditiously to ensure the safety of passengers
at sea. In particular, it was agreed that a
two-pronged approach should be taken, namely:
consideration of
short-term
measures related
to passenger ship operations and management; and
development of a
long-term
action plan for
the remaining work, which would be based on the
Costa Concordia accident investigation
report. 6.2 The Committee noted the
information provided in document MSC 92/6
(Secretariat) relating to the discussions and
action taken on passenger ship safety at MSC
91. 6.3 The Committee further
recalled that MSC 91 had: .2 approved the Revised
long-term action plan on passenger ship
safety, as set out in annex 3 to document MSC
91/WP.8. COSTA CONCORDIA CASUALTY
INVESTIGATION REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 6.4 The Committee considered
document MSC 92/6/3 (Italy), providing the
preliminary recommendations arising from the
marine casualty investigation into the
capsizing
of the passenger ship Costa Concordia, together
with documents MSC 92/INF.6 (Italy), informing
that the casualty investigation report had been
uploaded to GISIS, MSC 92/6/8 (IUMI) and MSC
92/6/10 (CLIA), both commenting on the
preliminary recommendations. 6.5 In considering the above
documents, the Committee noted the following
views expressed during the
discussion: .2
The
background information supporting the
preliminary recommendations in the casualty
investigation report was difficult to
find and the
working group to be established should
consider linking the various recommendations
to the relevant parts of the
report; .3 Any proposed measures
recommended by the working group to be
established should be linked to the outcome
of the casualty investigation report; their
scope of application should be clearly
established; and preparation of requisite
justifications for any proposed new or
expanded outputs should be in SMART
terms; 4 A
formal
safety assessment
study may be
needed to evaluate the effectiveness of any
substantial recommended measures, particularly
measures that could impact on all types of
passenger ships; .5 Some delegations expressed
the view that there may be a need to consider
preparing definitions for different types and
sizes of passenger ships, while others pointed
out that this issue had already been thoroughly
discussed during the passenger ship safety
initiative; and .6 While some delegations
felt that the principles of safe manning should
be further reviewed, others pointed out that the
principles had recently been revised with the
adoption of resolution A.1047(27) together with
the amendment of SOLAS regulation V/14, and that
it was premature to conduct another review until
experience is gained with the latest set of
amendments, also noting that the ongoing
revision to IMO model courses could be a better
way to improve the situation than amending
mandatory instruments. 6.6 Having considered the
above
comments,
the Committee decided to refer
documents MSC 92/6/3, MSC 92/6/8, MSC 92/6/10
and MSC 92/INF.6 to the working group for
detailed
consideration. RECOMMENDATIONS EMANATING
FROM THE CRUISE INDUSTRY OPERATIONAL SAFETY
REVIEW 6.7 The Committee, having
considered documents MSC 92/6/1 (CLIA) providing
three new outputs from the Operational Safety
Review and proposing to revise
MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.1, and MSC 92/6/9 (CLIA)
providing comments relating to the Costa
Concordia incident, decided to refer the
documents to the working group for consideration
with a view to preparing revisions to
MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.1, as
appropriate. 6.8
The
Committee, having
considered document MSC 92/6/5 (ICS) providing
information on a review on operational safety
measures carried out by ICS members' passenger
ship operating companies, including ro-ro
passenger ships and high-speed craft,
decided
to refer the document to the working group for
detailed consideration and
advice. EVACUATION
ANALYSIS 6.9
The
Committee
considered document MSC 92/6/2 (Germany and
Spain) expressing the view that simulation of
evacuation procedures, including basic rules on
how to carry out such simulation, should be made
mandatory under SOLAS or the FSS Code, together
with document MSC 92/6/4 (ITF and NI) providing
comments on document MSC 92/6/2 and, having
noted the views expressed during the discussion
that: .2 the outcome of the
ongoing revision of related recommendations
by the FP Sub-Committee (MSC.1/Circ.1238)
should be taken into account in making the
final decision to make it mandatory;
and .3 there would always be
the need for a well-trained crew to provide
professional assistance during
evacuations, agreed
to refer the above documents to the working
group for detailed consideration and
advice. SURVIVABILITY OF PASSENGER
SHIPS 6.10 The Committee considered
documents MSC 92/6/6 (Austria et al.) providing
information on the results of the studies on
damage stability of ro-ro passenger ships and a
goal-based damage stability research and
demonstration project proposing a two-phase
approach to review and improve the survivability
of passenger ships after damage, and MSC 92/6/7
(United States) commenting on document MSC
92/6/6. 6.11 During the ensuing
discussion, the Committee noted the views of
some delegations that a compelling need should
be established before considering the expansion
of ongoing work on damage stability, while
others expressed the view that the FSA Experts
Group should be instructed to consider the
research project and advise the Committee. In
this connection, the IFSMA observer made a
statement, which is set out in annex
46. 6.12 After a brief
discussion,
the
Committee decided to refer documents MSC 92/6/6
and MSC 92/6/7 to the working group for detailed
consideration and
advice. RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
WORKING GROUP ON PASSENGER SHIP
SAFETY 6.13
The
Committee re-established the Working Group on
Passenger Ship Safety and instructed it, taking
into account comments and proposals made in
plenary,
to: .2 for recommendations
having such a link, consider any actions
to be taken and advise on the possible
scope of application and the way forward;
and .3 prepare relevant
draft text for any recommendations on
operational, management or other issues
where immediate action is
needed; .2 consider the latest
recommendations from the Cruise Industry
Operational Safety Review (MSC 92/6/1 and MSC
92/6/9) and prepare revisions to
MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.1, as appropriate, for
approval by the Committee; .3 consider the outcome of
the ICS Review of Operational Safety Measures
to Enhance the Safety of Passenger Ships (MSC
92/6/5) and advise the Committee
accordingly; .4 consider whether the
voluntary guidance on evacuation analysis
should be made mandatory, taking into account
documents MSC 92/6/2, MSC 92/6/4. MSC 92/6/10
and MSC.1/Circ.1238, and advise the Committee
accordingly; .5 consider the proposal
related to survivability of passenger ships,
taking into account documents MSC 92/6/6, MSC
92/6/7 and MSC 92/6/10, and advise the
Committee accordingly; .6 update the Revised
long-term action plan on passenger ship
safety (MSC 91/WP.8, annex 3), including the
prioritization of the work to be undertaken
(i.e. target completion dates for each task),
taking into account the preliminary
recommendations (MSC 92/6/3) and the Costa
Concordia casualty investigation report (MSC
92/INF.6) and other documents submitted to
the session, as appropriate;
and .7 consider whether a
correspondence group should be established
and, if so, prepare draft terms of reference
for consideration by the
plenary. REPORT OF THE WORKING
GROUP 6.14 Having considered the
report of the working group (MSC 92/WP.8), the
Committee approved it in general and took action
as indicated below. Costa Concordia
casualty investigation report and
recommendations 6.15 The Committee, having
noted that the group had considered at length
the Costa Concordia casualty
investigation report and the associated
preliminary recommendations: .1
invited
Italy to provide more technical information
on penetration
depth in support of the recommendation for a
double-skin to protect watertight compartments
(WTCs) containing equipment and the
recommendation to consider relocation of the UHF
radio switchboard above the bulkhead
deck; .2 expanded the planned
output, 5.2.1.15, on Revision of SOLAS chapter
II-1 subdivision and damage stability
regulations to include consideration to limit
the down-flooding points on the bulkhead
deck for passenger ships (see also paragraph
23.20); .3 instructed the
Correspondence
Group on Casualty Analysis and the FSI (III)
Sub-Committee to consider the Costa Concordia
accident investigation report and advise MSC
93
accordingly; .4 invited Member Governments
and international organizations to submit
detailed comments and proposals to MSC 93 on
the Costa Concordia official
casualty investigation
report
(which is a joke);
and .5
invited
Italy to assist both the FSI (III) Sub-Committee
and the MSC Working Group by providing
further clarification and information, as
appropriate, with regard to the Costa Concordia
casualty investigation
report. Recommendations emanating
from the Cruise Industry Operational Safety
Review 6.16 The Committee noted that
the group had considered, in detail, the latest
recommendations emanating from the Cruise
Industry Operational Safety Review (MSC 92/6/1
and MSC 92/6/9) and had agreed to include three
additional guidance notes in the Recommended
interim measures (MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.1) (see
paragraph 6.24). In this connection, the
Committee endorsed the view of the group that
the role of shoreside management was critical to
the proper development and functioning of an
effective Safety Management System. Operational safety
measures to enhance the safety of passenger
ships 6.17 The Committee noted that
the group, having considered in detail the
review carried out by ICS passenger ship
operating companies (MSC 92/6/5), had agreed to
include four additional guidance notes in the
Recommended interim measures
(MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.1) (see paragraph
6.24). Evacuation
analysis 6.18 The Committee, having
noted the group's consideration of documents MSC
92/6/2, MSC 92/6/4. MSC 92/6/10 and
MSC.1/Circ.1238 related to evacuation analysis,
agreed to instruct FP 57 (SDC 1)2 to consider
the mandatory application of evacuation analysis
to non-ro-ro passenger ships and advise MSC 93
accordingly. Survivability of passenger
ships 6.19 In considering the
group's recommendations related to the
survivability of passenger ships, the Committee
agreed to forward documents MSC 92/6/6 and MSC
92/6/7, together with the EMSA and GOALDS
studies (SLF 55/INF.6, SLF 55/INF.7, SLF
55/INF.8 and SLF 55/INF.9), to SLF 56 (SDC 1)
for consideration. In this regard, the Committee
instructed SLF 56 (SDC 1) to examine the Phase 1
options that were technically justifiable for
raising the Required Subdivision Index 'R' and
to review other aspects deemed relevant to the
issue, such as the length of the ship, number of
persons on board and practical and operational
aspects, taking into account actual economic
factors, and advise MSC 93
accordingly. Re-establishment of the
Experts Group on Formal Safety Assessment
(FSA) 6.20 In light of the above
decision, the Committee re-established the
experts Group on Formal Safety Assessment (FSA)
and instructed it to review the EMSA and GOALDS
studies, taking into account the risk models and
calculated risk and the validity of the data and
assumptions that were used and the revised FSA
Guidelines (MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12), and advise MSC
93 accordingly (see also paragraph 23.28.10).
The Committee noted that the report of the FSA
Experts Group would be submitted to MSC 93 for
consideration under the agenda item on Passenger
Ship Safety. Revised long-term action
plan on passenger ship
safety 6.21 Noting that the group
had updated the Revised long-term action plan on
passenger ship safety (MSC 92/WP.8, annex 2),
the Committee agreed to bring forward the output
on "Review of conditions under which passenger
ship watertight doors may be opened during
navigation and prepare amendments to SOLAS
regulation II-1/22 and MSC.1/Circ.1380", for
inclusion in the provisional agenda for SLF 56
(SDC 1) (see paragraph 23.17). 6.22 In considering the
updated revised long-term action plan on
passenger ship safety, several views were
expressed during the discussion, in particular
that: .2 the Costa
Concordia accident had provided the
opportunity to review and take appropriate
action on SOLAS regulations and guidance
material related to passenger ship safety
issues, and therefore should not be
restricted to issues emanating solely from
the accident; .3 the long-term action
plan was not clear and should indicate the
status of each action item; and .4 actions related to
existing outputs should be separated from
those which could lead to new unplanned
outputs, which should require a full
justification in accordance with the
Committees' Guidelines. 6.23 Having considered the
above views, the Committee instructed the
Secretariat, in consultation with the Chairman
of the working group, to revise the long-term
action plan (MSC 92/WP.8, annex 2) with a view
to clearly identifying whether any proposed
actions are related to existing outputs or are
new outputs arising from the loss of the
Costa Concordia, and reissue it as
document MSC 92/WP.8/Rev.1. Recommended interim
measures for passenger ship companies to enhance
the safety of passenger ships 6.24 The Committee approved
MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.2 on Recommended interim
measures for passenger ship companies to enhance
the safety of passenger ships. In this
connection, the Committee noted the view of the
group that, in the future, a decision will need
to be taken regarding the final status of the
above interim
guidance. IMO has 2014 no info about its IMO Working Group on Passenger Ship Safety. We do not really know what it has done between MSC 92 June 2013 and MSC 93 May 2014. The Danish Maritime Authority has however published a Summary of the 93rd session of the IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC 93): In his opening address,
Secretary-General Sekimizu pointed to several
areas where the IMO should make a clear
difference. ... Mr. Sekimizu established that
he
expected the IMO to be able to gain
experience
(sic??) from the COSTA
CONCORDIA accident soon. ... Among the interesting issues
on the agenda were the following: Passenger ship
safety As a consequence of the loss
of COSTA CONCORDIA, the Committee established
a working group to consider passenger ship
safety. On the basis of both the specific
accident and the experiences gained, the
group
was to identify the need for new safety-related
initiatives. On the basis hereof, the
Committee determined a number of
temporary
measures that
passenger ships are urged to follow, such as for
example the location of lifejackets at the
lifesaving appliances of the ship, improved
route planning and restricted access to the
ship’s navigation bridge during
voyages. The Committee also decided to
consider the possibilities of making stricter
the criteria for ship’s survivability
following hull damage (damage stability),
including
the
use of watertight
doors during
voyages. The need for double hulls in the engine
room area and the possibilities of making the
use of evacuation analyses mandatory were also
to be considered. Furthermore, the Committee
decided to look into the possibilities of making
damage control plans more informative and
user-friendly, while examining whether to lay
down provisions on
mandatory
damage control
drills. Finally, the working group
had identified a number of potential focus
areas, where the member States are urged to
submit proposals for new measures, for example
on the location of vital marine equipment, the
extent of the emergency power supply and the
cooperation with local search and rescue
authorities. As the cause of the Costa Concordia capsize and sinking 14 January 2012 is still not established (apart from the Master being incompetent and responsible foe everything), it seems passenger ship safety has not improved at all since the M/S Costa Concordia incidents January 2012. Passenger ships are still allowed to sail in a not seaworthy condition with open and illegal watertight doors and with insufficent crew to handle mustering, evacuation, abandon ship and launching of lifesaving appliances. No temporary measures have been taken about these matters. The conclusion is that IMO Marine Safety Committee is not really doing its job 2012-2015. It is interesting to note that media do not react and report based on pertinent questions. More! Back to Start page!
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