Some particulars of the ship 'Estonia' from the data book
of Lloyd's Register 1994 are listed below.
Loa 155.43 meter,
Lpp 137.42 meter,
B 24.21 meter,
d 5.50 meter,
D 7.62 meter,
GT 15566,
N T 8372,
Dwt 3345 ton,
Inner ramp length 7.0 m, width 5.4 m.
An Estonian/Swedish joint venture company, Estline,
operated the ferry. The ferry was registered in Estonia.
1.2 The Departure September 27, 1994 from
Tallinn
One survivor (CÖ) told Swedish newspaper Dagens
Nyheter recently (November 30, 1997) that when he was
embarking the 'Estonia' on the afternoon of September 27,
1994, he found that the Tallinn port area was sealed off and
that his friend in his car could not drop him at the ship in
the normal way. CÖ had travelled twenty times with the
'Estonia' and this was the first time he had this problem to
join the vessel. CÖ went to the reception aboard and
tried to get a cabin and after a long wait he got a bed in a
cabin (no. 1049) on no. 1 deck below the car deck. CÖ
states more than three years after the accident that he
thought that all the crew behaved differently than at all
previous trips.
Another survivor (LB) has written a book about his
experiences before, during and after the accident, that the
Commission has ignored, but he does not mention the
observations of CÖ. LB had a car, which he parked on
the car deck, and had a cabin on deck no. 5. Many other
cars, lorries and trailers were loaded and the car deck was
almost full. It has been established that, due to confusion
or bad cargo planning, the 'Estonia' was listing to
starboard at the end of the loading. To sail upright the
port trim tank was filled.
The Swedish Maritime Administration was training Estonian
PSC (Port State Control) surveyors in the port of Tallinn at
the time and they had visited the 'Estonia' during the
afternoon. The bow visor was in the open position and the
inner ramp was down and the group noted that some rubber
packings were missing. No action was taken.
The ship left Tallinn around 19.00 hrs and then the inner
ramp and the visor itself had been closed. The last voyage
of the 'Estonia' had begun.
1.3 The Accident and the
Investigation
On the night September 28, 1994, the ferry 'Estonia' then
sank in the Baltic Sea en route between Tallinn, Estonia,
and Stockholm, Sweden. 852 people died including more than
500 Swedes. During a meeting on the same day at Helsinki,
Finland, September 28, 1994, the prime ministers of Estonia,
Finland and Sweden decided that a Joint Accident
Investigation Commission (JAIC or the Commission) should be
formed to investigate the accident. They also decided that
the chairman of the Commission should be Estonian. They did
not agree anything else, e.g. that the Commission should
follow the working rules and procedures of the IMO.
Five days later, October 2, 1994, searchers found the
wreck at 70 meters depth and fixed its position, 1.13.
The wreck was in international waters but inside the Finnish
economic zone. A remote control underwater camera was sent
down and the ship's bow door (the visor) was found missing.
The search for the visor started, but it was not found
until October 18, 1994, 1 570 meter West of the wreck,
because they searched for two weeks in vain East of the
wreck.
Note August 2000 - correction -
the wreck was in fact found with echo-sounder already on
September 30, 1994 by the Finnish ship the 'Suunta'. A false
wreck position was later announced 2 100 meters NE of the
real one. The visor was therefore > 3 000 meters from the
false wreck position. If the visor position was correct is
another question. JAIC could never explain how the visor
could have been lost there.
Note January 2001 - addition - it
is probable that the visor was found adjacent to the wreck
on the same day September 30, 1994 visor
on bottom. Four sonar
pictures were taken of the wreck and the sourroundings. On
all four pictures a pyramid shaped object was seen, which
Dr. Nuorteva, a Finnish scientist, thought was the visor.
The object was filmed by an ROV on October 2, 1994. The
Commission did not elaborate what the object was and the
film has later been edited. Instead the head of the Finnish
delegation in the Commission - Mr. Lehtola - announced a
false position of the wreck 1.13.
The object was filmed a second time by an ROV on October 9,
1994 and four films were made and registered under act B2 in
the Swedish archive, where it was stated that the films
were i.a. of the visor.
A fax exchange between two Commission
members were made on October 10, acts I15 and I16 in the
Swedish archive, about the visor, the two members
then looked at the four films, act B2, on October 11,where
no doubt they could see the visor. These films have
also later been edited not to show the 'object'.
Furthermore, on the same day the Commission informed the
media that the visor had not been found and that the
search continued. However, no real search was done by ships
between 12-17 October and then the visor was allegedly
suddenly found on October 18 by a Finnish ship
1.13.
It is probable that the visor was found already on September
30, 1994. The four films in act B2 do not exist any more.
Act B2 consists today of two 'original' films and
one 'summary'! The faxes I15 and I16 exist and refer
to an attached 'picture' showing i.a. the
visor. However, the attached 'picture' today
does not show any visor. It is instead a sketch of the bow
of the wreck with no visor.
1.4 The Commission
The members of the Commission were announced on October
10, 1994 at 17h00 (GMT+2) as follows (1):-
Estonia
Andi Meister, Chairman, Minister of Transportation and
Communications
Uno Laur, Member, Master Mariner, Merchant Marine
Consultant
Indrek Tarand, Member, Permanent undersecretary, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
Finland
Kari Lehtola, Member, Director, Disaster Research
Planning Committee
Helmo Iivonen, Member, Managing Director, Sea Rescue
Service
Tuomo Karppinen, Member, Senior Research Scientist,
Hydrodynamics
Sweden
Olof Forssberg, Member, Director General, Board of
Accident Investigation
Hans Rosengren, Member, Captain, Technical Nautical
Investigator
Börje Stenström, Member, Naval Architect, Chief
Maritime Investigator
Other experts and observers were also then, and later,
appointed to assist the Commission. Denmark and Norway
got observers. Germany, where the ship was built, was
excluded from the Commission. The public was never
invited to attend any hearings. The president of the
Swedish Master Mariner's Association was refused access
to the meetings, when he tried to attend. It was also
stated that:
'the Commission's terms of reference
depend on finding and inspecting of the Estonia's bow
door which will determine the course of future
activities'.
The Commission ignored completely any terms of
reference given by the Estonian, Finnish and Swedish
prime ministers, because only one week later, before even
finding the visor, it told the public what had
happened!
1.7
and 1.10. The next meeting of
the Commission was decided to be at Tallinn on October
17, 1994.
Actually the members of the Commission had appointed
themselves already on September 29 at an informal meeting
held at Turku, Finland (3). The provisional Commission
had then made its first public statement already on
October 4 - a First Interim Report - stating that the
accident was caused by water collecting on the car deck.
In retrospect that report was complete guesswork - a
simple stability calculation should have shown that water
collecting on the car deck could not have caused the
accident.
1.5 Changes to the Commission
Only 30 minutes after the announcement of the
Commission the Foreign Ministry of Estonia issued a
correction (2) to the appointments. Indrek Tarand of
Estonia was replaced by Enn Neidre - Member - Captain,
Estonian Shipping Company.
1.6 Conflicts of Interest
While the Swedish and Finnish members were civil
servants, mariners, educators and consultants who
previously had been involved with accident investigations
in their respective countries and had no relation at all
with the vessel of the accident, the same cannot be said
of the Estonian members, none of whom had ever
participated in a casualty investigation.
Andi Meister was, politically responsible for safety
at sea in Estonia, and formally head of the government
Estonian Shipping Company (ESCO) owning the vessel.
Uno Laur was introduced as the managing director of
the Average Agency CMM, an ex ESCO employee and an
experienced maritime specialist. It was not said that he
was the predecessor of Enn Neidre at ESCO.
Enn Neidre, was the head of the Navigation Department
of ESCO and Safety Advisor of Estline and the supervisor
ashore of the crew of the vessel.
The Estonian prime minister had appointed three
persons, who were very much involved with 'Estonia' and
its operations and safety to investigate an accident to
the same ship. The Finnish and Swedish members did not
complain about this conflict of interest among the
Estonian members.
1.7 The Meeting October 17, 1994,
(Part I)
At the meeting at Tallinn October 17, 1994, the
Commission reviewed new information available to it as a
result of additional video films taken from the sunken
ship and confirmed two things in a Second Interim Report
(4) signed by Meister, Forssberg and Lehtola.
1. The visor was lost underway.
2. Water entered the car deck at the forward ramp.
The visor had not yet been found, and naturally, it
had not been inspected, when the Commission stated this!
1.4. Even if the two
conclusions seemed innocent and obvious, in retrospect
one can conclude that (A) the visor was not lost
underway, and (B) water did not enter the car deck at the
forward ramp.
1.8 The Visor was not lost
Underway!
The reasons for this suggestion are (1) that
underwater videos of the wreck could not show when the
visor was lost and (2) that the visor was found the next
day almost one nautical mile West of the wreck according
to Lloyd's List October 20, 1994. 'Estonia' had been on a
westerly course from Tallinn to Stockholm, so a rational
person would have expected to find the visor South East
of the wreck, if it had been lost underway. The search of
the visor started East of the wreck and the visor had not
been found for two weeks. When the visor was found West
of the wreck, it was clear that the ship may have listed
and turned first and lost the visor later, and finally
the vessel could have drifted back to sink at the
position, where the wreck was found. Alternatively, the
vessel may have turned before the accident and was
heading back to Tallinn, when the visor was lost - in
either case evidently the vessel was not underway to
Stockholm anymore 1.13.
It is likely that the first statement about the
accident by the Commission was not true or a guess. The
visor could have been lost after the real accident took
place, that is because of the accident, when the ship was
not any longer underway to Sweden.
1.9 Water did not enter the Car Deck
at the forward Ramp!
It is not clear how the Commission could have made its
second statement based on some underwater video
films.
The forward ramp (or the bow ramp, or the inner ramp -
the Commission uses different words) was found in a
closed position at the wreck as seen from outside by
remote controlled underwater cameras.
Divers had not yet examined the forward/inner bow ramp
from inside. (It was never done, 1.14,
4.8 and 4.11).
In Stern 18/96 (8) Forssberg stated that the ramp opening
was too small for a diver to enter into the garage and
that cutting away of steel structure was necessary (which
was why the interior of the garage was never examined).
Other information says that the seven metres long inner
ramp was open 60-70 cms or much less at its upper part
(it was hinged at the car deck). The Commission was very
vague regarding how open the ramp was.
There was no proof whatsoever on the videos available
to the Commission on October 17, 1994, that water had
entered the car deck at the forward ramp as the ramp was
almost closed 1.15.5.
Furthermore, it was evidently not clear from the videos,
if/when the forward/inner ramp had opened up a little -
underway, before the accident, after the accident or when
the vessel sank to the bottom, 2.21
and 4.11. What was
the accident?
Three engine crew members in the soundproof engine
control room (ECR) midship, 3/E Treu, a motorman and a
systems engineer, had said to the Estonian police (Priit
Männik? 1.18) that they
had seen water entering at the forward ramp on a
TVmonitor of the garage in the ECR. 3/E Treu said it was
at 01.15 hrs, before the vessel started to list, the
others said that they saw the water in the garage after
the list had occurred. Further questioning of these crew
members at a later stage by the Commission, March 1995,
has shown that their statements are contradictory,
suggesting that they may have been mistaken. The systems
engineer later retracted his statement completely (10)
4.23.
Note August 2000 - in
fact the systems engineer had already told the
Commission on 28 September 1994 that the ship
was leaking, that the bilge pumps were running
and that the sudden listing occurred when the
car deck forward ramp was still in place (as
seen on the supervision monitor at least two
minutes after the listing).
Much later he provided the
sketch right of what he saw at least two minutes
after the sudden listing, i.e. a closed but
leaking ramp.
You wonder of course if he
really saw what he has sketched - at the time
the ship was listing about 15° and,
according to other info, trucks and lorries were
parked inside the ramp, so that you could only
see the tops (roofs) ot the trucks on the
monitor and not the ramp itself.
It seems that the Commission and the engine
crew members never understood that sufficient
water on the car deck always results in the
vessel tipping upside down and floating with the
keel up.
So even the second confirmation of the
Commission was not true. Could attending members
of the press and mass media have imagined, that
the Commission started its presentation of the
'Estonia' accident with two false
statements?
1.10 The Meeting
October 17, 1994, (Part II)
The Commission also presented the cause of accident at
the meeting (4). Thus, only nineteen traumatic days
after the accident, when the Commission met for the
second time, the cause was known!
How could the Commission have found the cause of
accident so fast? The diving underwater survey of the
wreck had not started, the visor had not been found nor
inspected, no suspect parts of the wreck had been
salvaged and investigated, the 137 survivors had not been
interviewed, no stability calculations had been done,
etc. Many survivors had given early statements, that
water had been seen on deck no. 1 before the first abrupt
listing, but these statements were ignored by the
Commission. No statement confirmed water in the garage,
unless you believed what one junior engineer in the
control room said that he had seen on a video display of
the garage.
What normally takes many months or even years to do,
the Commission did in less than two weeks during two
meetings. A record?
It is not known if the Commission discussed any other
causes of accident than the one that was presented on
October 17, 1994, as 'one of the most probable causes
of the accident'.
1.11 'One of the most probable
Causes of the Accident'
The heads of the three member nations of the
Commission, Meister, Lehtola and Forssberg, signed a
document (4) that was forwarded to the government of
Estonia, the Council of State of Finland, and the Swedish
National Maritime Administration. It said:
1. The bow door (visor) has separated from
the ship as a result of failure of all three locking
mechanisms. According to the observations made by
members of the crew this happened at about 01.15 when
water was simultaneously observed on the TV-monitor,
entering the car deck from openings along the vertical
sides of the forward (/inner - my note) ramp. The
failures have taken place, in case of the two side
locks, in the welding of the locking eye plates to the
bow visor and in case of the centre lock (as
previously shown) by failure of the lugs carrying the
locking plunger unit.
2. Following the failure of the locking
arrangements the bow visor has opened up under the
wave loads. The deck mounted hinge points have
eventually failed as a result of uncontrolled movement
of the 55 tons visor, leaving it attached only by
hydraulic actuating cylinders.
3. During the subsequent unrestrained movement
of the bow visor it hit the bow ramp (the
forward/inner ramp - my note) in several modes,
including hits from the rear to the upper protrusion
of the ramp, causing it to become dislodged from its
locking arrangements and to move to a partly open
position. The bow visor has ultimately separated from
the ship and disappeared overboard.
4. Partial opening of the (forward/inner - my
note) ramp had allowed water to enter the car deck due
to heavy sea. Collection of water on the car deck
eventually led to the loss of stability and capsizing
of the vessel.
5. After the vessel had turned over to almost 90
degrees starboard list, which is estimated to have
taken place in less than twenty minutes after the
damage to the forward ramp (or bow ramp - my note), it
started to sink with the stern first. The ship
disappeared from the radar screen of a Finnish
surveillance station at 01.48.
6. The vessel turned during the phase of losing
stability and landed on the seabed with an almost
easterly heading. It is assumed at this stage that
this was partly an attempt by the officers on the
bridge to turn the ship around and partly by the wave
action after the ship had lost propulsion power.
7. The locations of the EPIRBs have not been
found during the video documentation and their status
is therefore not known at the present time.
8. Emergency MAYDAY signals were sent by
'Estonia' at 01.24 and were received by ships in the
area and the MRCC at Turku.
No other possible causes were mentioned then or later
by the Commission to the governments of Estonia, Finland
and Sweden. Nobody in the governments has ever questioned
and inquired into the work of the Commission, if it meets
acceptable international standards. The writer made the
following analysis before the Final Report (13) was
issued:-
1.12 How the IMO was misinformed by
the Commission
Item 1 is mainly observations that three locks
have burst and how. Regarding the time 01.15 hrs
it must be noted that many surviving passengers (11) had
given a completely different time, 01.02 hrs, for
another earlier event - abrupt listing of vessel first
50° to starboard and then back to upright and then
to about 15° starboard list 3.16
- which was not mentioned by the Commission then or later
(13). It is a fact that nobody saw, heard or felt that
the visor separated from the ship, so the time for that
event cannot be given. 3/E Treu 1.9
had said that he saw water entering the garage at the
forward ramp at 01.15 hrs before the vessel
listed. Considering the passengers' statements the vessel
was probably already listing 40° then. 3/E Treu has
later been found to give contradictory statements,
1.19, 1.22,4.7 and 4.23.
Item 2 is a suggestion that the visor flipped
up and down around the hinge points. There is no proof
whatsoever, that it happened. Nobody witnessed such an
event 3.9. You wonder
how the Commission could have made up such an idea? One
passenger, V. Kikusts, a Latvian police officer, stated
that he saw the visor flipping at 00.26 hrs, i.e.
49 minutes before Treu saw water enter at the forward
ramp. Kikusts never warned the crew at the time (10).
Item 3 - it is correct, if the visor separated
from the ship in the upright condition, that it must have
hit the forward solid ramp from the rear 3.10.
It is then probable, if the top part of the visor is
stronger than the ramp, that the visor pulls out the
forward ramp completely 80°, after the
locks/securing cleats and hydraulics of the inner/forward
ramp are broken. The commission gave this impression
orally. However, the forward ramp was found only opened
8-10° - (60-70 cms at the top) or much less, 1°
or 10 cms; it was partly open according the Commission
1.11.4. In my opinion the ramp
was almost closed. This indicates that the visor may have
separated, when the ship had >35° list, when it
was hit from the side by a transient impactive force
2.8. Interestingly
enough internal stiffeners of the upper protrusion of the
visor and its thin steel cover plate are hardly damaged
4.10 - the port
stiffeners are only bent a little. Why was the aft end of
the visor top not more damaged, if it had forced open the
inner ramp? It should be recalled that the Commission
wrote point 3 before it had located the lost
visor, so it is not clear how the Commission could
have stated, that the lost visor had hit the ramp from
the rear, etc. The Commission had not seen the visor top!
The ramp top is not damaged.
Item 4. This statement is most deceptive. The
forward ramp was said only to have been partly open. Then
much water could not have entered the car deck, even
considering heavy seas (the heavy seas would push closed
the forward ramp) 2.19.
Members of the commission stated orally that the inner
ramp was completely pulled out by the visor, 2.21
and 4.23.
Nevertheless - as the ship was listing about 1° to
starboard due to a SW wind, any water entering the garage
should have collected on the starboard side of the
garage/vessel and gradually increased the list of the
ship, unless it drained out through the scuppers in the
deck. However, what surviving passengers state is, that
there was a temporary loss of stability, when the vessel
suddenly first listed 50° to starboard, and then
stability clearly was regained at 15° list to
starboard 3.16.
Thereafter, the vessel was only very slowly heeling over,
until it was on the side. The Commission stated -
quote:
'Collection of water on the car deck
eventually led to the loss of stability and capsizing
of the vessel.'
However, water on the car deck should always have led
to the vessel heeling to a certain critical angle - about
34°, after which the vessel should have tipped
upside down and floated with the keel up, 2.16,
2.19 and 5.5.
The Commission never made any stability and righting
arm calculations before issuing its statement! It
should be clear to anyone that there could not have been
any water on the car deck, because the vessel never
tipped upside down.
Item 5 - First is should be noted that with
90° list, the 'Estonia' should have tipped upside
down. The Commission did not know that the vessel could
not float with 90° list! The Commission then
stated:
'The ship disappeared from the radar
screen of a Finnish surveillance station at
01.48'.
This meant that the 'Estonia' was under observation
from shore and you evidently wonder what this
observer saw before 01.48 hrs. Finnish and Swedish
newspapers reported October 1 and 2, 1994, that 'Estonia'
was off course when the accident took place, and this
information can only have originated from the Finnish
shore radar observer. However, later the information was
retracted. The Commission has never informed, what the
shore observer saw before 01.48 hrs, e.g. when and
where the 'Estonia' changed course, slowed down, stopped,
drifted, etc. 4.20.
Note August 2000 - according to
later information the Finnish surveillance station at
Utö did in fact plot the 'Estonia' and other ships
on its radar screens prior to the accident and this plot
was handed over to the Commission. However, later the
plot disappeared, because it didn't tally with the
sequence of events invented by the
Commission!.
Item 6 - it is evidently impossible that a SW
wind/wave action turned the vessel (to port). See also
1.13 and Forssberg's statement
about the vessel's course and speed after the accident,
and figure 2.23. And
how did the Commission know that the vessel turned after
losing the visor? Why could the vessel not have turned
before it lost the visor? According to the Commission
nobody observed the 'Estonia' prior to 01.22 -
01.24 hrs, so nobody could have known that the
'Estonia' had turned after it lost the visor at 01.15
hrs. Finnish shore radar and any vessel including the
'Mariella' and the 'Silja Europa' reportedly did not
observe the 'Estonia' prior to 01.22-01.24 hrs.
According to the 'Mariella' the 'Estonia' was immobile in
the water at 01.24 hrs in a position, which later
(when the visor was found) turned out to be one mile
south of the visor. Who could have seen that the
'Estonia' turned after losing the visor, when it was not
known where and when the visor was lost?
Unfortunately, no open discussion of the Commissions
cause of accident or events before and after the accident
was possible in October 1994. The public had to believe
the Commission. The IMO had adopted two resolutions about
casualty investigations. Resolution A.440(XI) says that
all the details of the accident shall be circulated to
the members of IMO and resolution A.637(16) says that the
hearings and all protocols, etc., shall be public. Two
obvious questions are? Did the Commission intentionally
misinform the public and the IMO in October 1994? Why was
all information confidential and/or secret? It seems we
will never know, unless there is a new investigation.
1.13 The
Visor
The visor was found on October, 18, 1994, about one
nautical mile to the West (!) of the wreck (as reported
by Lloyd's List October 20, 1994). Its position was later
determined to abt. N59°22',97, E21°39',33
± abt. 100 meters according to a message from the
Swedish Navy December 9, 1994.
The wreck was first reported at N59°23'54.60",
E21°42'10.20". This position was later modified to
an 'as found' position of N59°22'56.13",
E21°41'00.98". These two positions are 2 112 metres
apart. The heading of the wreck was 95°, i.e. the
bow pointed approximately to the East. The visor was thus
about 3 150 meter from the first wreck position and 1 570
meter from the second wreck position or abt. 2 600 m West
of the first wreck position and 1 570 meter West of the
second position. It was also concluded that the visor was
one mile north of the Mayday position.
In spite of this confusion it is sure that the
Commission knew early that the visor was found well West
of the wreck and North of the Mayday position!
Note August 2000 - the
Commission knew very well the correct wreck position
already on September 30, 1994, but the Finnish head of
delegation - Kari Lehtola - 'isolated' the wreck
by announcing to the media the false wreck position 2 112
m NE of the real position. The reason for this was
probably that the same ship that found the wreck also
found the visor adjacent to the wreck! For unknown
reasons the Commission did or would not admit this as
they apparently planed to blame the accident on the
visor. There are strong reasons to believe that the
official visor position was also false, e.g. the
Commission never announced the exact position of the
visor on October 18, 1994; only that it was about one
nautical mile West of the wreck, the position of which
was then incorrect - 'isolated'. The visor
position determined by the Swedish Navy was that of a red
buoy allegedly anchored on top of the visor.
Addendum 4 January 2001 - the
above thoughts were further confirmed in December 2000
when a sonar
picture of the wreck and
visor (!) made 1996 was published. One reason for hiding
the fact that the visor was found adjacent to the wreck
already on September 30, 1994, may be the fact that all
four key witnesses of the crew had previously (on the day
of the accident before the wreck was located) stated that
they saw the visor missing at the bow when the ship was
sinking. Thus, when the visor was in fact found adjacent
to the wreck, these testimonies were easily proven false.
To protect the lying witnesses the Commission apparently
decided not to inform the public that the visor was found
adjacent to the wreck.
In Stern 18/96 (8) Forssberg stated that:
"the Commission knows the two positions,
where the visor and 'Estonia' sank. From the distance
between the two points can the course and the speed of
the ship be calculated".
The reader is referred to figure 2.23.
According to Forssberg the course of the ship at the
accident was 90° (i.e. due East!) and the speed was
1 570 meter in 40-45 minutes i.e. about 1 knot! Was
'Estonia' underway between Tallinn and Stockholm in these
circumstances? In the Final Report (13) the ship changes
course 180° to port after losing the visor
4.20.
The visor was salvaged end November and brought to
Hangö, Finland, where it can still be seen today. No
efforts to preserve or protect the visor were taken.
1.14 The Diving Survey December 3 and
4, 1994
A diving survey of the wreck was carried out December
3 and 4, 1994 by the Norwegian company Rockwater A/S for
a cost exceeding US$ 1 million. The Swedish maritime
authority paid for the survey to establish whether dead
bodies and/or the whole wreck could be salvaged. The
Commission was invited to inspect the wreck for damages
that caused the accident. Stenström was in charge.
It seems however that the Commission's survey was done
only to confirm its cause of accident 1.11.
Below items have been established based on different
sources.
(i) Three bodies on the bridge were never
identified 1.22.
(ii) The positions of the garage video monitors on
the bridge were not checked.
(iii) The chart room next to the bridge was never
searched.
(iv) The Master's, Chief Engineer's and the Radio
Officer's cabins were never searched.
(v) The inside of the forward ramp and its control
and locking equipment were not checked. The alleged
damaged locks of the inner ramp were not seen
4.11 .
(vi) The car deck was not examined. Actually the
whole garage was not entered into as the forward ramp
was closed 4.8.
(vii) The control panel of the inner ramp and the
visor on the car deck was not examined.
(viii) There was no attempt to examine any spaces
on deck no. 0 and to verify the position of the
watertight doors 4.8.
(ix) The whole starboard side of the ship was not
examined (as the wreck was resting on the starboard
side to the bottom - no attempt was done to do the job
from inside).
(x) Even if the remaining hull parts of the visor
locks and hinges were partly recorded on video no
effort was done to cut out the relevant parts for
detailed study ashore. The side locks' lugs and part
of the hinges torn off from the visor were left at the
bottom of the sea.
(xi) It seems to have been very difficult to enter
into the garage as the inner ramp was only partly open
1.12.3. You wonder then how
this ramp could have been open during the accident to
allow several thousand tonnes of water to enter and
then how it had closed itself not permitting a diver
to enter to examine the inner ramp from inside the car
deck.
(xii) It is peculiar that the complete bottom hull
was not investigated from inside as water had been
reported by many survivors on deck no. 1 below the car
deck, and it should have been established where this
water came from. Even if it was difficult to enter the
car deck at the inner ramp, it was of course possible
to enter any other space inside the ship through the
stairways. It is assumed that the fire doors between
the car deck and the stairways are still locked. The
Commission has always maintained that the water in the
garage flowed down to deck no. 1 through the closed,
locked and smoke-tight fire doors and this possibility
should have been confirmed in-situ.
Note August 2000 - the
dive survey was never fully reported. Divers
were inside the ramp and in the garage. One
diver also inspected the sauna space on deck no.
0 from inside. The aft ramp starboard ramp was
apparently found partly open, etc. etc. The
video films taken during the dive survey were
therefore edited before being published. Many
damages and observations went unreported. Also
the divers spent a lot of time looking for a
suitcase in one of the cabins under direction of
Swedish police, which was not reported until a
Swedish newspaper, FinansTidningen, published an
article about it in 1999.
Note January 2001 -
Swedish media has reported 2000 that five
Swedish divers visited the ship earlier -
probably already 2-9 October 1994. What these
divers did is not known. One possibility is that
they applied explosive devices on the bow to
separate the visor from the wreck and attempted
to blow the ramp open part
6. In August 2000
private divers filmed the forward collision
bulkead starboard side. They found a big opening
- hole - in the bulkead three metres below the
focsle deck - se picture right, which has never
been reported by the Commission. This opening
could not have been caused by falling off of the
visor. What caused it? Explosives? When and
why?
There was a second visit to the wreck by
underwater cameras in the summer 1996 when the
bunker oil was removed from the vessel by a
Finnish specialist company. It was known that
400 tonnes of fuel oil could be removed from the
ship, even if it was almost solid due to the
+2° temperature inside the wreck. However
only 230 tonnes were found and pumped up, when
the equipment failed. Divers from Holland might
have visited the ship and might have been inside
the garage the summer 1996 to prepare for the
covering of the wreck. Details are not
known.
1.15 The Meeting
December 15, 1994
The Commission met at Stockholm, December 15, 1994.
The Commission then confirmed in point 3 of the Press
Release (5) that the strength of the locking devices
for the bow visor in combination with the sea load on the
visor in the prevailing wave condition and headway of the
ship is the main cause of the accident. Point 5 of
the Press Release is quoted in its entirety here:
5. The diving investigation carried out on
the wreck has revealed that the ramp was locked in
closed position prior to the accident. After loss of
the visor the ramp has been significantly more open
than the present position on the wreck, at least
during some phase of the development of the
accident.
How the Commission could have concluded after the
diving inspection that the ramp was locked in closed
position before the accident is not known. How could
divers establish how the ramp had been locked nine weeks
earlier? As shown above the divers did not even
examine the inside of the forward ramp, where the locks
are located 1.14 (v) and
(xi).
It is not known how the Commission managed to conclude
that 'the ramp has been more open than found at the
bottom of the sea, at least during some phase of the
development of the accident'. This statement is very
odd - according to the second interim report 1.11.4
we should believe that the inner ramp opened up more
during the accident than found at the bottom, whatever
that means, allowed 1 100 tons of water to enter the
garage so the 'Estonia' listed suddenly 18-20°, and
then, when the vessel was still afloat or had sunk - we
do not know what 'at least during some phase of the
developments of the accident' means - we are told
that the ramp closed again to a partly open position,
2.19 and 2.21.
Note August 2000 - later
observations of the underwater videos tend to confirm
that the ramp was (a) not locked before departure (it was
held back by ropes) and (b) had never been pulled open by
the visor. The reason why the Commission on December 15
stated that the ramp had opened up completely and then
closed itself during the accident was that sufficient
water to sudden list the ship could not enter a partly
open ramp - it had to be fully open. But the JAIC did not
then understand that the 'Estonia' would tip upside down
within seconds with a fully open ramp.
1.16 Strength
Investigation of the Visor Locks
Another remarkable thing about item 3 of the press
release December 15, 1994, is that it states that the
strength of the locking devices is the main cause of the
accident. However, it was not until December 19, 1994,
that the Commission ordered the Royal Institute of
Technology, Stockholm, to carry out a very limited
strength analysis of the visor locking devices (6). The
result of this analysis was only ready much later and was
still not completed 24 months later 1.21.
The request by the Commission is quite revealing how
the dive survey was cut short. The Royal Institute was
requested to investigate the plates of the visor, where
the side lock lugs were welded. Then it says: 'The
lugs remain on the wreck and cannot further be
examined'. You wonder why these small lugs, which
apparently were detached from the visor, and the locking
bolt and the hull lugs had not been brought up to the
surface for examination by the divers! In a previous
letter (7) from the Finnish materials and structural
integrity company VTT dated November 29, 1994, i.e. four
days before the dive survey was done, it was suggested
and the suggestion is underlined/bold in the letter:
"For complete investigation and modelling,
the side locking lugs and broken halves of the
Atlantic lock should be recovered from the wreck."
However, the Commission decided to leave these vital
parts of the investigation at the bottom of the sea. It
means that the Commission could not determine the
condition of the side locks just before the accident,
which shows the incompetence of the Commission.
To do a strength analysis of the visor locks, apart
from establishing the actual 'as is' condition of
the locks, it is first necessary to establish the
environment where the locks were used and the loads
(demand) applied on the locks. The weather was not very
severe (SW force 7). It seems that only a very
rudimentary (hydrodynamic) load calculation was done of
the total load on the visor by a periodic hydrodynamic
wave load. However such a simple estimation does not say
how much load is transmitted by each lock, each hinge and
each of all the other contact points of the visor to the
hull and in what order the locks and hinges break.
In this case the Commission only assumed that an
external periodic load acted on the visor in the upward
and aft directions. The Commission never investigated if
the load could have been internal (added weight of water
that had leaked into the visor as suggested by the
Germans) acting downward and forward. The Commission
never thought that the load might have been sideways
(transient impactive load = 10 times bigger than any
external periodic wave load) when the vessel was already
listing.
When the strength analysis is finished you have to
check the result against criteria of acceptance. If the
strength does not meet the criteria, there is
failure.
There are two types of failure - fractures and ductile
failure.
Fractures occur at lower excessive loads. Ductile
failure (deformation, rupture) occurs when the load is
really excessive. In this case the Commission stated that
ductile failure had occurred, i.e. the loads had been
excessive tension and the connections of the locks had
been ripped apart.
The Commission never answered the obvious question,
why the locks had never only fractured and/or deformed
earlier under less severe loads, if the design of the
locks was so bad as alleged. No check of fractures was
ever done.
Anyway, the 'strength analysis' was just window
dressing by the Commission, as it had already stated its
result before it was ordered to be done by the Royal
Institute of Technology.
1.17 The Part-Report April, 1995
The Part-Report, April 1995, is a technical document
(9). It is the only part-report ever issued by the
Commission. As it was known before the Part-Report was
issued, that it declared the builder of the 'Estonia'
responsible for the design and manufacture of the alleged
faulty locks, the shipyard had some time earlier
suggested to the Commission that the visor may have
separated from the ship due to another cause. The
shipyard simply stated that the maintenance of the visor
had been deficient during the fourteen years after the
ship was delivered and that the strength of the visor
outfit had suffered. It added that due to bad maintenance
the visor was leaking, that it then filled up with water
during heavy weather, and that the weight of the water
might have broken the hinges of the visor and that then
the visor tipped forward and broke the locks, etc. The
Commission dismissed this theory without comments.
Instead, the Part-Report said:
'The Commission has previously concluded
that the accident was initiated by the locking devices
for the bow visor being unable to withstand the loads
imposed during the prevailing speed, heading and sea
conditions. This conclusion is still valid'.
And:
'The content of the current Part-Report
may be amended and editorially modified as part of the
Final Report, but it is anticipated that all facts and
conclusions reported herein will remain unchanged in
substance'.
It was now only six months after the accident. The
Commission had explained everything in the open, but the
public had had no possibility to evaluate what the
Commission had said. The extra-ordinary cause of accident
declared only nineteen traumatic days after the accident
was upheld as truth. The visor had separated from
the vessel when it was underway (vessel was otherwise
un-damaged) at 01.15 hrs. Water had entered
at the inner ramp (even if the ramp was found
virtually closed on the wreck). The vessel had
capsized, i.e. turned belly up, and had sunk (while
all survivors had only suddenly experienced an abrupt
list to 50° starboard, after which the vessel
re-gained stability at 15° starboard list and only
slowly sank permitting over 230 persons to abandon the
ship and 137 to survive). Everyone expected the Final
Report to be a formality to be published a few months
later as promised.
But the Final Report was still not published 30 months
later.
The Part-Report was very easy to criticise.
· It did not explain why the visor was
lost 1 570 metres West of the wreck and the ship's
course and speed before and after the accident
1.13.
· It did not describe or explain the sudden
listing to 50° starboard and why the ship
regained stability at 15° list 1.12.1.
· It did not explain how the vessel could have
floated on the side with water on the car deck - a
completely unstable condition, 1.12.5,
2.16 and 5.5.
· It did not explain the slow sinking of the
vessel.
· It did not explain anything about the locks
of the inner ramp and conditions inside the
garage.
· It did not consider the statements given by
the passengers, particularly the time of the accident
1.12.1.
· It did not consider any other cause of
accident than the one given seven and nineteen days
after the accident.
· It did not establish where the water,
noticed by many survivors on deck no.1 long before the
abrupt listing, originated from, and why so many
persons from deck no.1 managed to survive.
· It did not consider all the loading
possibilities of the visor leading to failure.
· It did not clarify the extraordinary
performance of the forward, inner ramp, which first
was partly open (or almost closed) allowing little
water to enter, and which then was significantly more
open to permit large amounts of water to enter the
garage, so that the ship would list suddenly, and,
finally, which closed itself so it took a long time
for the ship to list to 90° 1.15.
On 14 April 1995 the author wrote for the first
time to the Commission to protest against the quick
conclusions. The Commission never replied.
After the Part-Report was issued nothing really
happened apart from people resigning from the Commission
1.18. The Commission met about
20 times. The Commission now and then (six times!) stated
that the Final Report was going to be published, e.g.
September 1995, beginning 1996, July 1, 1996, end of
1996, February 1997, etc. The absolute final meeting to
agree the final report was March 12, 1997. The Commission
met, agreed the report and went home. On October 24, 1997
Uno Laur informed (Lloyd's List) that the Final Report
was to be published in early December 1997. The Final
Report was published December 3, 1997 chapter
4.
1.18 Resignations from the
Commission
Enn Neidre resigned from the Commission in April 1996,
and was replaced by Mr. Priit Männik, a senior
security police chief in Estonia. Mr Männik had led
the interviews of all Estonian crew and survivors in
1994. Mr. Männik was forced to resign in his turn
November 5, 1997 and was replaced by Jaan Metsaveer, a
professor and expert to the Commission.
Andi Meister resigned from the Commission in July
1996, and was replaced by Mr. Heino Jaakula, a naval
architect and expert of the Commission. Mr. Meister
accused the Swedish members of the Commission to have
manipulated the video films taken of the wreck by divers
and ROVs 1.23. The Commission
was then without chairman. During the autumn 1996 the
President of Estonia appointed Uno Laur as chairman.
Börje Stenström died end February 1997. It
was indicated that Dr. Michael Huss, of the Royal
Institute of Technology, tockholm, and expert to JAIC
would conclude the work of Stenström.
Olof Forssberg resigned in May 1997 after having
admitted that he had lied about a letter he mishandled as
director general of the Swedish Accident Investigation
Board (SHK). Forssberg also resigned as director general
from the SHK. Forssberg and Stenström were replaced
by Mrs. Ann-Louise Eksborg, new director general of the
SHK, and Mr. Noord, a master mariner and expert of JAIC.
It is noteworthy that Forssberg, after admitting lying,
was offered a new job with the Swedish government keeping
his salary and title.
Mr. Bengt Schager, Introduction
and 1.19, resigned as expert
(of psychology) from the Commission in September 1997.
Schager did not believe any longer in the Commission's
findings according to newspapers. It was never clear what
an expert of psychology was doing in the investigation.
Mr. Schager was appointed an expert to the Commission
directly by the Swedish government at an hourly rate of
USD 250:- per hour and his total bill was about USD 700
000:- before he resigned (Swedish newspaper Expressen
971016). His input to the investigation has never been
explained. It seems that he spent most of the time
'editing' survivors' testimonies, 4.7
and (12).
1.19 Modified Testimonies
The Commission based its theory mainly on statements
given by two surviving crew members - 3/E Treu and fire
patrol man Linde. Statements from other survivors, crew
and passengers, were completely ignored by the
Commission. Both crew members talked to the press after
the accident and described what happened aboard before,
during and after the accident. These 'virgin' statements
do not support the theory of the Commission.
Linde told Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter October 7,
1994, that he made the fire patrol and experienced a
heavy impact in the garage, 1.22
and 4.7. Later, when
he was back on the bridge, there was a telephone call
about water on deck no. 1, which Linde was sent down to
check.
Later, in March 1995, when questioned by the
Commission, Linde was telling a completely different
story. Now the telephone call was about noise at the
inner ramp and that Linde was ordered down to check the
garage! The problem, the time and the persons on the
bridge have changed. The modified statement was meant to
fit the theory of the Commission. Then of course, as
Linde was not telling the truth, his statement became
very contradictory and unbelievable. It is strange that
the Commission members doing the interview or questioning
did not ask Linde about what he had told Dagens Nyheter,
about telling the truth or about having been told to
change his statement to fit the Commission's theory.
Treu's case is similar. After the accident he told a
story, evidently to fit the Commission's theory. However,
Treu and Linde had not co-ordinated their new stories to
fit each other - therefore Treu and Linde contradicted
each other 4.7.
The author read Dagens Nyheter early October 1994 and
Linde's original story, and used it as one little support
for my accident theory. When the writer approached an
expert of the Commission (Schager), he was told that
Linde had given a completely different story to the
Commission! That Treu and Linde contradict each other is
public knowledge. The interested reader may refer to
other sources (10) i.e. Jörle/Hellberg,
'Katastrofkurs' ISBN 91-27-05715-1.
There is no doubt that the two crew members have
changed their early statements about the accident to the
media into something else later, which 'better fits' the
theory of the Commission.
Addendum January 2001 - the
reason for the changed statements is probably the
following. When the surviving crew first came ashore they
were apparently told to say on the 28 September that they
had all seen the visor already missing from the ship when
they abandoned it at about 01.30 hrs. However, when the
wreck was located on the 30 September the
visor
was apparently found still hanging on starboard below the
bow, where the ship had finally sunk at 01.32-01.36 hrs,
a few minutes after they had left the ship. It naturally
meant that the false statements would be revealed if the
finding of the visor became known, so (a) the crew
statements were adjusted a little and (b) the finding of
the visor was kept secret 1.22
and the visor was later removed from the wreck by
explosives and pulling but salvaged at the wreck! It is
very likely that watch keeping AB Linde's first statement
is correct i.e. that he was sent down long before 01.00
hrs to check leakage below waterline into the ship and
that the sudden listing occurred at 01.02 hrs as a
majority of survivors stated. Actually - Linde may have
discovered the leakage in the first place earlier -and
reported it - and the crew including Treu and Sillaste
was working to stop it - however, Linde described it only
as a sudden impact when he was on the car deck. Later
Linde may have been sent down again to see how the
preventive work progressed when the listing
occurred).
It is strange that the members and experts of the
Commission did not discover the contradictions given by
these key witnesses. Of course the Commission used the
altered statements to support its theory, but it may not
have been aware that the statements then had been
modified.
The Final Report (13) should of course report all the
different statements given by Linde and Treu as reported
in the press in October, 1994, to the Estonian security
police (Mr Männik 1.9) and
the final statements given by the same people to the
Commission in March, 1995. In reality the Final Report
(13) does not mention Linde's statement to DN.
The statements given by passengers and most other crew
have apparently also been modified 4.7.
Disregarding the testimonies that do not contribute at
all to finding the cause of the accident, there are
very few statements by the passengers supporting the
theory of the Commission. This should also be clear
in the Final Report, if it included the complete
statements given by passengers. In fact the Final Report
only includes 'edited' testimonies of the passengers
4.7.
1.20 The Final Report
The Final Report (13) was apparently agreed in March
1997 and was supposed to be published end May, beginning
June 1997. However, then Forssberg 1.18
resigned in May and the Final Report was postponed. It
was rumoured that it was going to be published in
December 1997.
For over three years the Commission had only mentioned
one cause of accident, which was established seven
dramatic days after the accident 1.4.
All work was then done only to confirm the Commission's
implied proximate cause of accident. The Final Report
(13) does not even mention any other possible causes.
The Commission never made public any other possible
causes of the accident or that it has discussed any other
cause of accident.
Experts of the Commission told me that it has
discussed other theories. When the writer asked for
details, he was met by silence.
It seems that most information published by the
Commission does not stand detailed scrutiny and that the
Commission can not admit it. The Commission adhered to
its statement in the Part Report 1.17- all facts (sic!) remained unchanged. This
was confirmed when the Final report was published
chapter 4. Nothing was
changed from what had been said already October 4,
1994,1.4.
1.21 Statement by Kari Lehtola,
December 3, 1996
Mr Lehtola said (Lloyd's List December 4, 1996) that
the Commission's final report manuscript should be ready
for release by February (1997).
Mr Lehtola also said:
'It is very possible the structure of the
bow visor was not as good as it should have been. We
have carried out a lot of calculations, and we have
more still to do. I cannot really comment more - the
results are not yet in and it is too early to draw
final conclusions' .
Thus two months before the manuscript should be ready
for release, 'we (the Commission) have still more
(calculations) to do',....'the results are not yet in...
too early to draw final conclusions'. This was said
20 months after the Part-Report was published in April
1995 1.17 and 24 months after
the strength analysis was ordered to be done by the Royal
Institute of Technology at Stockholm 1.16.
Ten months after Lehtola made his statement no Final
Report had been published.
The statement of Lehtola was quite revealing. The
reason the report was stopped in 1996 was that the German
group of Experts presented its findings to the Commission
in August 1996. The Germans showed that the maintenance
and the condition of the visor were bad. The Commission
had evidently not checked the maintenance and condition
of the visor and did not know what to do - more work was
necessary. But no more work was done - no new technical
reports about the visor were handed in and filed with the
Commission after the pathetic statement of Lehtola (the
record of reports, etc. was public - the reports
themselves were secret). In the end JAIC gave up and
decided to publish its Final Report (13), where the visor
was in perfect condition but incorrectly designed before
the accident 4.6.
Note August 2000 - actually the
Commission met frequently between March-December 1997
modifying and changing the Final Report (13) written by
an unknown ghot writer, which explains the many
contradictions in the Final Report. No manuscript of the
Final report dated March 1997 exists.
1.22 Two Versions about who were on
the Bridge?
The Commission had not identified the three bodies on
the bridge of the wreck 1.14(i).
Linde had given two statements about who were on the
bridge 4.7.
The first version is as follows:- In Dagens Nyheter
October 7, 1994, in the interview of Linde by an Estonian
speaking Swedish reporter, it is said that fire patrol
man Linde was at 00.30 hrs in the garage when he
experienced that the vessel suffered a heavy impact, so
that Linde fell to the deck. Linde contacted the bridge
by talkie-walkie and reported the incident and was told
to check the forward ramp and to continue the fire patrol
round.
Linde found nothing wrong at the ramp, he continued
his patrol round and returned to the bridge at
00.40 hrs, where he reported to 2/0 Peeter
Kannussaar and saw 3/0 Andres Tammes and the Master (Arvo
Andresson).
Linde also noted that the vessel's speed was 15 knots.
At about 00.45 hrs there was a telephone call to
the bridge taken by 2/0 Kannussaar. It was about the
presence of water on deck no. 1. Kannussaar told
Linde to go down and check deck no. 1. Linde descended
the forward stairway and reached deck no. 4 level, where
the stairway is reduced in width down to deck no. 1.
There Linde met many passengers from deck no. 1 saying
that there was water on deck no. 1. Linde could not go
down against the flow of passengers. Linde contacted the
bridge by way of talkie-walkie and reported this. The
abrupt listing 50° to starboard and back to upright
and to equilibrium at 15° starboard list occurred
soon thereafter. Linde then reached deck no. 7 and
assisted passengers into liferafts.
According to MÖ 2.12
the abrupt listing took place at 01.02 hrs.
In a second statement to the Commission Linde stated
another version to the effect that he was in the garage
much later (10). He experienced the heavy impact,
reported it by talkie-walki to the bridge (2/0
Kannussaar) and was told to check the forward ramp for
five minutes. Linde did not notice anything suspicious.
He then returned to the bridge where he met 2/0 Tormi
Ainsalu and 4/0 Kaimar Kikas. (The reason for this was
that the watch had been changed at 01.00 hrs. Note
also that 'Estonia' had two second officers (2/0),
Kannussaar and Ainsalu).
Linde stated clearly to the Commission that 2/0
Kannussaar and 3/0 Tammes had left the bridge and he did
not mention the presence of the Master. The time was thus
after 01.00 hrs.
According to the second statement Linde was then on
the bridge a few minutes, when there was a telephone call
taken by 2/0 Ainsalu. The call was about strange noises
at the inner ramp and Linde was ordered to go down to the
cardeck and check. He descended the stairway and reached
deck no. 5 level and asked the reception to open the fire
doors to the garage. Then there was the abrupt list
20° to starboard. And then the passengers started to
escape from deck no. 1 saying there was water on deck no.
1. Linde followed the passengers to deck no. 7 and, there
he reported by talkie-walkie to the bridge (2/0 Ainsalu),
that there was water on deck no. 1.
After Linde left the bridge to attend the emergency in
the garage, the Commission suggested that the Master
visited the bridge at 01.07 hrs (Lloyd's List
March 17, 1997). The Master is quoted to have said 'we
are one hour late' and then he left. How the
Commission knows this is not known to the writer. All
persons on the bridge at that time, whoever they were,
are dead, and according to many passengers, the vessel
was already listing since 01.02 hrs.
3/E Treu has told the Commission that he overheard
the last conversation between Linde on deck no. 7 and 2/0
Ainsalu on his talkie-walkie/portable VHF unit in the
engine control room. Treu states that Linde told
Ainsalu that 'there was water in the garage', not on deck
no. 1 as Linde stated. Treu has also told the Commission
that he (Treu) saw water entering the garage at the
forward ramp at 01.15 hrs. Treu is the star witness of
the Commission. It is his statement the Commission refers
to in 1.11.1. The abrupt
listing should then have taken place after 01.15
hrs. 3/E Treu has also stated to the Commission that,
after the abrupt listing had occurred, he talked to 4/0
Kaimar Kikas on the bridge about the possibility to shift
ballast in order to reduce the listing caused by free
water in the garage (sic!). This conversation took place
between 01.20 and 01.25 hrs. There are two
possibilities:
1. The abrupt listing took place at 01.02 hrs
and it is likely that 2/0 Peeter Kannussaar, 3/0 Andres
Tammes and the Master Andresson were on the bridge at
that time, as Linde had left them there a few minutes
earlier. However 3/0 Tammes' body has been found in the
Baltic.
2. The abrupt listing took place after 01.15
hrs and 2/0 Tormi Ainasalu and 4/0 Kaimar Kikas were on
the bridge as Linde has told the Commission in his second
statement and which is confirmed by 3/0 Treu who had (a)
heard Linde (on deck no. 7) talk to Ainsalu (on the
bridge) via talkie-walkie/VHF and (b) had talked to Kikas
on the bridge on the phone later. The question may be
answered by 'Who sent the Mayday at 01.22
hrs?'
At 01.22 hrs there was a first Mayday by VHF
(Channel 16) from 'Estonia' received by M/S Mariella. The
Commission states that the desperate caller is 2/0 Tormi
Ainsalu. The total communication is 2 minutes and 9
seconds long with many interruptions and of no real value
(10).
Then the first caller is replaced by 3/0 Andres Tammes
at 01.24 hrs. The communication is now clear and
orderly 1.11.8. Tammes gives
the position of 'Estonia'. The voice of Andres Tammes has
been identified by both Treu and Linde and others on the
recording of the transmission, where in the background
also the voice of 1/0 Juhan Herma has been identified,
when it calls out the position. At 01.30,06 hrs
the transmission was broken (10).
It is therefore quite clear that 3/0 Tammes and 1/0
Herma were on the bridge. (The body of Tammes was later
found in the Baltic. He thus managed to get out of the
bridge).
There are three bodies on the bridge. The Commission
assumes they are 1/0 Herma, 2/0 Ainsalu and 4/0 Kikas to
support its (and Treu's) cause of accident. It is also
possible that they belong to 1/0 Herma, 2/0 Kannussaar
and the Master Andresson, and then the Commission's cause
of accident is not valid and 3/E Treu is caught
lying.
The Commission's diving survey never checked the
identities of the bodies.
Note August 2000 - it is now
easy to establish that the first version is nearer to the
truth than the second version about the times, but that
probably both versions do not reflect what actually
happened aboard the 'Estonia' during the accident. The
writer thinks today that both Linde and Treu lied about
what they experienced and that crew members on the bridge
survived ... and
disappeared.
1.23 The Video Films
The various underwater surveys were recorded on video
and it is likely that the above question could have been
resolved by checking the video films. During 1996 some
Estonian members of the Commission accused that the
videos had been edited or tampered with by the Swedish
members. The matter was dropped after Meister and Neidre
had resigned from the Commission.
1.24 Conclusions of Chapter 1
Considering above you should conclude:
1. The Commission decided the cause of
accident only nineteen days after the accident
1.10.
2. The three key witnesses stating, that they
saw water entering the garage, have given
contradictory testimonies later. One has retracted his
statement, 1.12 and
4.23).
3. The time of the accident stated by one key
witness - 01.15 hrs - is neither confirmed nor certain
1.12.
4. The visor was lost 1 570 metres West of the
wreck. The ship's course and speed before/after losing
the visor have never been explained 1.13.
6. The inner ramp was never open 1.15.
It was closed! It may have been damaged a little after
the accident, 2.19
and 2.21.
7. The strength analysis of the visor outfit was
done after the cause of accident was announced and was
incomplete/not finalised 1.21.
8. There is no proof that the visor separated,
when the ship was underway to Söderarm/Stockholm
1.8.
9. There is no proof that water entered the
garage at the forward ramp, 1.9
and 1.12.1.
10. With water on the car deck the vessel should
have tipped and floated upside down, which she did not
5.5.
11. No other causes of accident have been
investigated 1.20.
12. The Commission has ignored completely the
passengers' statements.
13. The video films of the survey of the ship
have been tampered with 1.23.
Taking above thirteen points together you reach the
surprising conclusion that it is certain that the garage
was completely dry when the abrupt listing occurred (at
01.02 hrs). This is not what the Commission
wants the public to believe and you should wonder what
actually happened.
Immediately after the accident there were reports in
the press 1.12.5) that
'Estonia' had changed course before the accident. At the
same time Linde and others told the press that there was
water on deck no. 1 below the car deck, before the sudden
listing occurred. Then the press published corrections
about the course change - it was not confirmed - and
the Commission published its statement, that water on
the car deck caused the accident. Water on deck no. 1
was forgotten. But at that time the Commission had no
solid proof at all that there had been water on the car
deck. The Final Report (13) does not produce any proof at
all that there was water on the car deck, except a
statement by 3/E Treu that water came in at 01.15
hrs.
The writer finds it quite extraordinary that nobody
within the Commission including the experts and observers
has ever questioned the hastily conclusion that there was
water on the car deck. Linde never saw any water on the
car deck. The systems engineer 1.9
never saw any water on the car deck. He said that the 3/E
told him that he saw water on the car
deck 4.23.
All stability theory says that there could not have been
any water on the car deck, 2.16
and 5.5. A ship
does not sink with water on the car deck. So what
could have happened? Chapter 2 is my suggestion what
happened.
