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Dear Mr Eriksson.
Thank you for your answer and explanations by
the SSPA-consortium. In the meantime I have sent
the below e-mail to the SSPA and HSVA
consortia:
Quote
----- Original Message -----
From: Anders Björkman
To: d.vassalos@na-me.ac.uk ; Andrzej Jasionowski
; krueger@tu-harburg.de ; Claes Källström
; Björn Allenström ; Olle Rutgersson ;
valanto@hsva.de
Cc: karin.markides@chalmers.se ; John
Graffman
Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 7:48 AM
Subject: Vinnova - Estonia research
Gents,
As you know I am reviewing your research and
publish articles about it and would be grateful for
answers of some questions. Pls cc this message to
relevant assistants of your research incl. members
of your Panel of Experts:
1. Intitial inflow:
All SSPA model tests indicate an inflow of >2
000 tons/min with open ramp in the given conditions
resulting in an angle of heel >45° within a
couple of minutes.This does not tally with
survivors testimonies and the JAIC report.
1.1 Why is this simple fact not emphasized in
the final reports?
1.2 Why is this not shown in the computer
animation?
1.3 Why does the computer animation show ECR
crew watching monitors at <2° heel, when
the crew was not in the ECR then?
1.4 Why does the computer animation show
evacuation at <10° heel and rolling, when
model tests show that vessel heeling does not stop
then?
1.5 How could two ECR crew reach open, port
(upper) deck 7 after evacuation?
2. Floating on deck house:
The Estonia had 170+ windows in the starboard
side deck house, decks 4-6, with a total pane area
> 110 m² and also normal doors in the aft
bulkhead. The SSPA model tests indicate heavy
rolling at heel >45° and you would expect
all these windows to break and the doors in the aft
bulkhead to be pushed in by waves/water when
submerged resulting in massive inflow of water into
the deck house. However, only a small inflow is
recorded in the model test as only two windows per
deck are assumed 'broken'; at one time the model
floats at 90° heel with about six metres of
deck house submerged and 18 metres above water line
and rolling severly. Windows are generally not
permitted in a superstructure and, if fitted, must
be fitted with permanent, internal closing devices
of steel to provide weather tightness.
2.1 Why are only two windows per deck aft
assumed being broken allowing water inflow?
2.2 Why are no (MARIN) model tests done of deck
house (pls not 'superstructure') flooding at
90° heel with deck house side six metres below
water?
2.3 Why do you insist that the deck house is a
weather tight superstructure, when according
international standards/rules it is a simple deck
house that does not provide any buoyancy at any
time?
2.4 Can you give any example of a ship floating
on a deck house prior sinking?
3. Floating/sinking upside down:
When a vessel has capsized upside down, the
compressed air trapped in the intact hull provides
buoyancy. If the buoyancy exceeds the weight of the
vessel, it floats and cannot sink. If the buoyancy
is less than the weight of the vessel, it sinks
immediately (and persons can be trapped in air
pockets inside the sunken vessel; compare e.g. a
submarine). In the Estonia case it seems it took 20
minutes for the air to compress to allow sinking
and this was simulated in model scale by allowing
air to escape through two vents!
3.1 Does it really take long time for air to be
compressed inside a capsized hull and does the
buoyancy of a capsized vessel diminish with time
after capsize?
3.2 If answer is yes, can you give any
examples?
4. General, Definition of wave
impact.:
The project description included investigation
of other possible sinking scenarios and assistance
by a Panel of Experts.
4.1 Why didn't you investigate sinking due to
hull leakage below waterline and loss of (hull)
buoyancy as cause of accident?
4.2 Do all members of your Panel of Experts
agree with your findings?
4.3 What is your definition of a wave impact and
what force/load does it apply to a structure (bow
visor, window pane)?
Kind regards
Anders Björkman
Heiwa Co - European Agency for Safety at Sea
Un-quote
So I repeat:
SSPA model tests show clearly that the inflow of
water into the superstructure through an open ramp
(visor has ripped open the ramp and initiated the
accident that now starts 15 minutes earlier than
according JAIC) is of the order 2 000 tons/minute
and that an angle of heel >45° degrees
develops within a couple of minutes (full scale -
less than a minute model scale). This is not
according to testimonies of survivors and would
prevent any evacuation of any kind. The computer
animation shows something completely different.
It is quite clear from testimonies that the
engine crew outside the ECR observes, like all the
passengers, the heavy rolling and a stable heel
<15° durig several minutes that enables the
passengers and some crew to escape to open deck 7
during about 10 minutes. The engine crew on the
other hand returns to the ECR ... and observes a
closed ramp 2-3 minutes later, stays in the ECR for
5-10 minutes and then escapes, two of them to deck
7 port side, when the heel exceeds 60°. An
impossible task.
So the SSPA model tests thus show that the heel
becomes >45° very quickly (see e.g. fig 37
in SSPA Final report) and then it is suggested that
the ferry floats on the deck house for 22 minutes
with heeling increasing from 45° - 90°.
Reason is that only two (!) side windows on each of
decks 4, 5 and 6 break and allow water inflow into
the deck house.
There is no scientific evidence of any kind that
only two windows per deck breaks. According
internationl standards, experience and regulations
a deck house is not water tight, weather tight or
air tight and is flooded momentarily when submerged
as all windows break and doors are pushed open. If
the deck house, decks 4-6, were a superstructure,
as suggested by the SSPA consortia, windows are
generally not permitted at all, and, if fitted for
any reason, must be arranged with an internal
closing device of steel, etc. Doors must be weather
tight with six closing toggles and with a sill of a
certain height. The MARIN tests of flooding
superstructure (sic) deck 4 do not prove anything
as only 2 windows in the side are open and the
openings are just below water.
Actually the alleged floating on the deck house
(called superstructure (sic) by SSPA) is the most
obvious falsification of the research. Any ship
does not ever float on a deck house. A ship does
not float on window panes.
Regarding the sinking of a capsized hull upside
down with bottom up that is floating on compressed
air trapped inside the hull, the proposals of SSPA
are nonsense. Either the capsized vessel floats
permanently on the compressed air as buoyancy
exceeds weight, or sinks immediately when weight
exceeds buoyancy as per Arkimedes. It does not take
20 minutes for the air to be compressed or the
buoyancy to be reduced to be less than the weight.
The arrangement with two valves in the bottom and
allowing air to escape in a controlled fashion due
to scale effects is foolish talk.
You are thus kindly recommended not to hand over
the SSPA/HSVA reports to the government until the
content has been properly verified by, e.g. any
reputable authorities. I would suggest that you ask
the classification societies Det Norske Veritas,
Registro Italiano Navale (RINA) and Japanese NK or
the experts you used to select the research
consortia in 2005 to comment upon
A. the rapid water inflow/flooding of the
car deck superstructure - does it tally with
testimonies and allow evacuation?,
B. the alleged floating on the deck house
- is it possible or should not the deck house be
flooded momentarily, i.e. the vessel should capsize
at once?, and
C. the mysterious sinking of the capsized
hull (what happens to the air and Arkimedes
principle?).
Reason why I did not attend the workshop was
that I was otherwise engaged and had already
informed the consortia of the above and had been
told by SSPA (Jazionowsky) that it was
unreasonable. HSVA (Valanto) could not offer any
comments at all.
Kind regards
Yours sincerely
Anders Björkman
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